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Existing literature on the contract law doctrine of duress 
identiﬁes a number of tests to determine conditions under 
which a contract can be voided. No article provides a speciﬁc 
and formal economic analysis on the link between rent- 
seeking and the conditions under which allowing a defense of 
duress is wealth enhancing. This article shows that commit-
ments made as a result of ex ante investments by threaten-
ing parties made solely for the purpose of transferring, rather 
than creating wealth, ought to be voidable. We discuss cases 
in which a test based on rent-seeking enhances efﬁciency 
where previously proposed tests do not.
I .  I N T R O D U C T I O N
In contract law, a party that breaches (or intends to breach) a con-
tract may assert a duress defense to relieve himself from liability, 
if he can demonstrate that the non-breaching party induced him to 
enter the contract by a wrongful threat. Courts have allowed parties 
to assert the defense even absent a threat of tortious or criminal 
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conduct. A wrongful economic threat is sufﬁcient. Unfortunately, 
the cases do not develop a coherent concept of what constitutes a 
wrongful economic threat.1
Law and economics scholars have attempted to provide such a 
coherent concept,2 but excluding some commentary,3 we are unable 
to locate any game-theoretic analysis that formalizes the link be -
tween rent-seeking and the conditions under which allowing duress 
as a defense is socially desirable. However, as we have argued in a 
recent law review article, wrongful threats can be thought of as 
threats that are made as part of endeavors to transfer wealth, rather 
than generate wealth, through the formation of a contract.4 Given 
recently asserted doubts regarding the value of economic reasoning 
in analyzing the contract law doctrine of duress,5 we ﬁnd it impor-
tant to provide the link between rent-seeking and duress. In this 
article, we crystalize this link through a formal game-theoretical 
model.
In particular, we present a modiﬁed version of previously used 
models,6 and show that allowing a duress defense to the threatened 
party when the threatening party’s threat is motivated by rent-
seeking is wealth enhancing. The intuition is the following: When a 
party can make investments that enable him to engage in acts that 
generate beneﬁts exceeding the costs of such investments, he will 
make those investments regardless of whether or not such invest-
ments may harm another party. In these circumstances, if another 
1 Here we are focusing on the simple breach case; the analysis extends identically 
to cases of contract modiﬁcation. See generally Mark Seidenfeld and Murat C. 
Mungan, Duress as Rent Seeking, 99 Minn L Rev 1423 (2015) for a more detailed dis-
cussion of the doctrine of duress and its application to contract modiﬁcation cases.
2 See, for example, Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, Threatening an “Ir-
rational” Breach of Contract, 11 S Ct Econ Rev 143 (2003); Oren Bar-Gill and Omri 
Ben-Shahar, The Law of Duress and the Economics of Credible Threats, 33 J Leg Stud 
391 (2004); Oren Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar, Credible Coercion, 83 Tex L Rev 717 
(2005); Steven Shavell, Contractual Holdup and Legal Intervention, 36 J Leg St 325 
(2007). For a more detailed literature review, see Seidenfeld and Mungan, 99 Minn L 
Rev 1423 (cited in note 1).
3 See, for example, Robert Cooter and Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics (Pearson 
Addison Wesley 4th ed 2004); Benjamin Hermalin, Avery W. Katz, and Richard Cras-
well, Contracts, in 1 Handbook on Economics 3–128 (Elsevier 1st ed 2007), Todd 
Zywicki, Libertarianism, Law and Economics, and the Common Law, 16 Chapman 
L Rev 309–24 (2013); and Seidenfeld and Mungan, 99 Minn L Rev 1423 (cited in 
note 1), discussed in section II.
4 Seidenfeld and Mungan, 99 Minn L Rev 1423 (cited in note 1).
5 See Shawn Bayern, The Limitations of Economic Reasoning in Analyzing 
Duress, 99 Minn L Rev Headnotes 141–60 (2015).
6 See, for example, Ben-Shahar and Bar-Gill, 33 J Leg Stud at 394-97 (cited in 
note 2) and Ben-Shahar and Bar-Gill, 83 Tex L Rev at 720–27 (cited in note 2).
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party is in fact likely to be harmed by the ﬁrst party’s investment, 
the law ought to enable these two parties to enter into an enforce-
able contract where the ﬁrst party refrains from engaging in the act 
that harms the second party, since they will exercise this option 
only if the harm to the second party is greater than the beneﬁt to 
the investing party. In these circumstances, the investor is moti-
vated by wealth generation, and a duress defense can only hinder 
wealth-improving arrangements. If, however, the investment is cost 
justiﬁed (for the ﬁrst party) only by the prospect of a wealth transfer 
from a second party trying to avoid harm, then allowing the second 
party to assert a duress defense removes the ﬁrst party’s incentives 
to invest. Although the transfer of wealth itself does not reduce 
social wealth, the investment in making the threat credible reduces 
social wealth. Hence, it is optimal to allow a duress defense in these 
circumstances. Next, we brieﬂy review the relevant law and eco-
nomics literature on duress and the previous articles linking rent-
seeking to the contract law doctrine of duress. In Section III, we 
describe our model, and use it to formalize this link. In Section IV 
we conclude.
I I .  P R E V I O U S  L I T E R AT U R E  A N D  
R E N T- S E E K I N G
Bar-Gill and Omri Ben-Shahar’s7 and Steven Shavell’s8 articles are 
the most inﬂuential law and economics studies analyzing duress in 
the context of contract law. Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar claim that “en-
forcement of an agreement, reached under a threat to refrain from 
dealing, should be conditioned solely on the threat’s credibility.”9 
The intuition behind their claim is the following: if courts void 
agreements that result from a credible threat, they run the risk of 
incentivizing the party that is in a position to threaten the second 
party to engage in the threatened activity without informing the 
second party of their intention to do so. This is bad for both par-
ties in situations where the threatened activity reduces the surplus 
available to the two parties and, therefore, where the act could have 
been avoided with an enforceable contract.
Shavell, on the other hand, deals with contractual hold-ups more 
broadly, and suggests that contracts entered into as a result of engi-
7 Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 11 S Ct Econ Rev 143 (cited in note 2); Bar-Gill and 
Ben-Shahar, 33 J Leg Stud 391 (cited in note 2); and Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 83 Tex 
L Rev 717 (cited in note 2).
8 Steven Shavell, 36 J Leg. St 325 (cited in note 2).
9 Ben-Shahar and Bar-Gill, 33 J Leg Stud at 391 (cited at note 2).
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neered hold-up situations ought to be voided.10 This follows in 
Shavell’s model, because the engineered hold-up situation is harm-
ful to the second party, and can be avoided if the engineering party’s 
incentives can be removed by preventing him from beneﬁting from 
an enforceable contract.
Both articles provide excellent insights regarding the welfare ef -
fects of enforcing contracts under various situations, but we be lieve 
that they do not consider some important cases where the proposed 
tests do not reach the efﬁcient result. In particular, Bar-Gill and Ben-
Shahar’s model does not incorporate potential ex ante investments 
by the threatening party to make his threat credible ex post.11 More 
speciﬁcally, a party’s investment in putting himself in a situation 
to threaten another party plus the cost of carrying forward with 
the threatened conduct can exceed the beneﬁts that party has to 
gain from executing his threat, even if just the cost of executing the 
threatened conduct (absent investment costs) is lower than these 
beneﬁts. These investments are inefﬁcient, because they result in 
beneﬁts that are lower than the total costs that enable such beneﬁts. 
Despite this, the threat is credible, because at the time the threat 
is made, it is in the threatening party’s best interest to execute the 
threat if the second party refuses his demands. This is because ex 
ante investments are sunk, and therefore they do not affect the 
threatener’s decision. In such situations, contrary to Bar-Gill and 
Ben-Shahar ‘s proposal, it is not desirable to enforce contracts: by 
making duress a defense, the law removes all potential gains that 
the threatener may obtain form the threatened party. Removing this 
incentive will induce him to not invest in making the threat in the 
ﬁrst place, thereby preventing inefﬁcient investments.
Shavell, on the other hand, excludes another case from his analy-
sis, namely, what he terms “engineered situations”12—situations in 
which the beneﬁt to the engineering party from executing his threat 
is greater than the total cost of engineering and carrying out his 
threat. In such situations, the law can reduce social welfare by not 
enforcing contracts negotiated between the engineering party and 
his intended victim. Allowing a defense of duress induces the engi-
neering party to undertake the threatened action without inform-
ing the party who would be harmed. When this action causes more 
10 Shavell, 36 J Leg Stud 325 (cited in note 2).
11 Although the authors brieﬂy comment on ex ante investments in Bar-Gill and 
Ben-Shahar, 83 Tex L Rev 717 (cited in note 2), they do not formally study the effects 
of such investments and they do not relate them, as we do here, to the concept of 
rent-seeking.
12 Shavell, 36 J Leg Stud at 325 (cited in note 2).
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harm to the second party than the beneﬁt the engineering party has 
to gain from exercising his threat, the two parties can generate a 
surplus by entering an enforceable contract. But the law, by allowing 
a defense of duress, does not permit the generation of such surplus, 
and thereby reduces social welfare.
As we demonstrate in this article, a test based on the concept of 
rent-seeking produces the efﬁcient result in these two cases that are 
excluded in Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar’s 2004 article13 and by Shavell14. 
Although previous commentary has correctly pointed out that the 
concept of rent-seeking can shed light on the conditions under 
which allowing a defense of duress is desirable, no study of which 
we are aware provides a game-theoretical framework in which this 
claim is formalized. Benjamin Hermalin, Avery Katz, and Richard 
Craswell, for instance, suggest that rent-seeking provides “[a] bet-
ter justiﬁcation of the doctrine” of duress than those justiﬁcations 
based on credible coercion as suggested by Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar 
in 2004.15 Similarly, Cooter and Ulen touch on the topic of rent-
seeking by distinguishing between voluntary contracts that create 
wealth versus involuntary contracts that only transfer wealth.16
Lengthier and more systematic discussions that illustrate the rela-
tionship between duress and rent-seeking with reference to speciﬁc 
cases also exist. For instance, two recent articles one by Seidenfeld 
and Mungan17 and one by Zywicki18 link the concept of rent-seeking 
to contract enforceability issues encountered in a number of cases, 
including Alaska Packers19 and Austin v Loral.20 In reviewing the 
former case, Zywicki argues that a modiﬁcation entered as a result 
of rent-seeking threats were held to be unenforceable by the court.21 
Seidenfeld and Mungan use the facts of the latter case to construct a 
hypothetical demonstrating “that allowing a defense of duress is not 
warranted, even if the threat-maker is responsible for the vulner-
ability of the target to the threat,” when the threat is not motivated 
by rent-seeking behavior.22 These two articles, and previous com-
mentary, provide insights regarding the relationship between rent-
13 Ben-Shahar and Bar-Gill, 33 J Leg Stud 391 (cited in note 2).
14 Shavell, 36 J Leg Stud 325 (cited in note 2).
15 Hermalin, Katz, and Craswell, Contracts at 49 (cited in note 3).
16 Cooter and Ulen at 269-71 (cited in note 3).
17 Seidenfeld and Mungan, 99 Minn L Rev 1423 (cited in note 1).
18 Zywicki, 16 Chapman L Rev 309 (cited in note 3).
19 Alaska Packers Association v Domenico, 117 F 99 (9th Cir 1902).
20 Austin Instrument, Inc v Loral Corp, 29 NY2d 124 (1971).
21 Zywicki, 16 Chapman L Rev 309 (cited in note 3).
22 Seidenfeld and Mungan, 99 Minn L Rev at 1440 (cited in note 1).
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seeking and duress. Neither, however, provides a formal economic 
model to pinpoint this relationship.
In this article, we provide the simplest game-theoretical frame-
work to formalize the link between rent-seeking and duress. In par-
ticular, we consider parties that can invest in order to put themselves 
in a position where they can extract a transfer from a targeted vic-
tim by putting him in a vulnerable position. However, these invest-
ments need not be completely wasteful, they can generate value to 
third parties. Therefore, the party investing need not necessarily 
be hoping for a wealth transfer from his potential victim; he may 
be investing simply to receive some payment from the third par-
ties for whom he is generating beneﬁts. Therefore, the inquiry that 
determines whether a contract between the threatener and the vic-
tim ought to be enforceable is whether the threatener is making the 
investment for purposes of transferring wealth beyond that which 
he is generating. This inquiry is equivalent to investigating whether 
the person is engaging in rent-seeking.
I I I .  M O D E L  A N D  A N A LY S I S
We consider an extended version of the complete information model 
of duress proposed in previous work.23 Speciﬁcally, we consider a 
sequential move game where a potential plaintiff (P, female) moves 
ﬁrst and a potential defendant (D, male), who, if approached moves 
second. P has the option of investing I ≥ 0, which enables (but does 
not necessitate) her to interact with D.24 If P does not invest, the 
game ends. If P invests, she has to decide whether to approach D 
and inform him that if he does not make a payment to P (which is 
to be determined through negotiation, later) she will perform an act, 
which we call act x, that causes damages of V to D and generates a 
beneﬁt of B to P, or whether to perform x without approaching D.25 
If she chooses the latter option the game ends. But, if P chooses the 
former option, D must decide whether to refuse P’s demands, or to 
negotiate on a price to avoid the (full) performance of x. The nego-
tiations result in a beneﬁt of r  to P and a cost of y  to D, absent the 
23 See above, Ben-Shahar and Bar-Gill, 33 J Leg Stud at 394–97 (cited in note 2) and 
Ben-Shahar and Bar-Gill, 83 Tex L Rev at 720–27 (cited in note 2).
24 For example, P might invest in getting “dirt” on a celebrity that P believes it can 
sell to a sensationalist media outlet. See Seidenfeld and Mungan, 99 Minn L Rev 1423 
(cited in note 1), for other examples.
25 For example, if P invests in getting the dirt, it will have to determine whether 
to simply sell the dirt, or instead whether to offer D the opportunity to pay P not to 
reveal it. See id for other examples.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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duress defense.26 r  need not equal y, because it may be necessary for 
act x to be partially performed for P to make his demands in the ﬁrst 
place. Hence, let r  =  p + e  and y  = p + h  where e  ≥ 0 and h  ≥ 0 de-
note the partial beneﬁt to P and partial harm to D, respectively. We 
assume that e is relatively small, in particular that e  ≤ min{I, B}. If 
the duress defense is made available to D, however, it is assumed 
that P can be made to pay p back D. Finally, when D refuses P‘s de-
mand, P decides whether or not to perform.27 These interactions are 
summarized in Figure 1 below.
The subgame perfect Nash equilibrium (SPNE) of the game il -
lustrated in Figure 1 can be obtained through backward induction. 
26 Negotiations may reveal that the parties cannot reach a mutually agreeable 
outcome. In these cases, the parties receive their outside options, that is, B − I for P 
and −V for D. In these cases, the game is uninteresting, and the stable perfect Nash 
equilibrium is unaffected by whether there is a duress defense, because P has nothing 
to gain from threatening D, and therefore he always does x. Thus, we focus on the 
relevant case where V + r  > B + y. 
27 Note that as long as B > 0, P always chooses to execute his threat when D refuses 
P’s demands.
Figure 1. Sequential game between P and D.
Note: Square brackets denote payoffs when there is a duress defense, and D invokes 
the defense.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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Table 1, below, lists the equilibria under various conditions and as 
a function of whether or not duress is a valid defense for D.28 As the 
table illustrates, whether or not duress is a defense effects results 
when (and only when) r > max{I, B}, that is, when P’s payoff from 
threatening D and on negotiations transferring wealth from him to 
herself exceeds both the cost of investment and her external beneﬁts 
from exercising the threat. On the one hand, when B > max{I, r } it is 
always in P’s interest to invest in the ﬁrst place because she can reap 
a beneﬁt of B, which more than offsets the cost of investment I, sim-
ply by performing x. Furthermore, after she invests, she has nothing 
to gain from threatening D; she is always better off performing x 
because doing so provides him beneﬁts (of B) that are greater than 
what she has to gain through a wealth transfer from B (that is, r). 
On the other hand, when I > max{r, B}, the potential plaintiff knows 
that she will deﬁnitely be incurring losses through her investment; 
neither the gains from a transfer from D (that is, r), nor the beneﬁt 
from performing x (that is, B), off sets the cost of investment.
For these reasons, whether or not duress is a valid defense is rel-
evant for efﬁciency purposes only when r > I. Given this observa-
tion, the next proposition summarizes the conditions under which 
efﬁciency considerations require D to be allowed a valid defense of 
duress.29
28 We are ignoring potential equalities and considering only strict inequalities in 
deﬁning conditions I–IV in Table 1.
29 Only for simpliﬁcation purposes, we assume that if P is indifferent between 
investing and approaching and investing and performing x, that he chooses to invest 
and approach. This does not change any of the results, but simply eliminates some 
SPNE that generate results equivalent to what is presented here.
Table 1. SPNE and Total Payoffs
No Duress Duress
SPNE Total Payoff SPNE Total Payoff
I r  > B > I
Approach and 
negotiate r  − I − y Do x B − I − V
II r  > I > B
Approach and 
negotiate r  − I − y Don’t invest 0
III B > max{I, r} Do x B − I − V Do x B − I − V
IV I > max{r, B} Don’t invest 0 Don’t invest 0
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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Proposition 1: (i) Allowing a defense of duress is efﬁcient when 
the cost of investment (I) exceeds the external beneﬁts (B) to P 
from performing the threatened act. (ii) Conversely, allowing a 
defense of duress when B > I can cause inefﬁciencies.
Proof: (i) When I > max{ r, B} the defense has no effect on so-
cial welfare. When r > I > B, it follows that r − I − y − 0 since  
e  − h < e < I. (ii) When B > max{I, r} the defense has no effect on 
social welfare. When r  > B > I it follows that r − I − y  > B − I − V  
since V + e  > B  + h  is a necessary condition for negotiations to 
not breakdown. See note 15, above, for the irrelevance of the 
case where V + e  < B  + h.
Proposition 1 formalizes the intuition that we conveyed in the 
introduction. In circumstances where P has an opportunity to make 
investments that lead to beneﬁts greater than the investment, al -
lowing a defense of duress incentivizes her to perform the act that is 
detrimental to D without giving him an opportunity to compensate 
P to refrain from harming D. Hence, the law ought to enforce con-
tracts, and thereby give the two parties an opportunity to generate 
and share a surplus when P’s external beneﬁts are likely to offset 
her cost of investment. Conversely, when the cost of investment is 
greater than external beneﬁts to P, the duress defense acts as a deter-
rent by informing P that she cannot proﬁt through socially wasteful 
investment. Therefore the law ought to allow duress as a defense in 
this situation. 
We turn now to discuss a few implications of our analysis. First, 
note that when I = 0, we revert to the complete information model 
in Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar.30 Given B > 0, as we have assumed, all 
threats by P to do x are credible, and according to the model, the 
defense of duress should not be available. This is precisely the impli-
cation of our analysis. When I = 0, rows II and IV in Table I refer to 
nonobservable cases, and hence, as Proposition 1 Part (ii) suggests, 
allowing a defense of duress causes inefﬁciencies. The implications 
of our analysis differ from those derived by Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar31 
when I > 0. In particular, when I > 0, conditions that would fall 
under row II in table I are possible. In those cases, our analysis sug-
gests that duress should be a viable defense, even though P has a 
credible threat ex post, and therefore Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar’s anal-
ysis would suggest enforcement.
30 Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar, 33 J Leg Stud 391 (cited in note 2).
31 Id.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
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A second observation to be noted is that when I > 0, the poten-
tial plaintiff is “engineering,” as in Shavell’s work,32 the circum-
stance which may causes D harm unless he subsequently meets P’s 
demands. In contrast, our analysis suggests that efﬁciency is not 
necessarily enhanced by voiding all contracts in such situations. In 
particular, when r  > B > I, as proposition 1 suggests, contracts should 
be enforced, because otherwise, P may be induced to perform x with-
out notifying D of his intentions, and therefore giving him an oppor-
tunity to mitigate his losses. These two observations highlight how 
our test differs from those suggested by Bar-Gill and Ben-Shahar33 
and Shavell.34 In particular, because our test includes potential ex 
ante investments and external beneﬁts to P, it is able to identify 
potential inefﬁciencies that do not exist in previous analyses.
It is important to note that the same considerations allow us to 
identify the link between rent-seeking and conditions under which 
allowing duress as a defense enhances efﬁciency. The conditions 
that give rise to row-I type cases are those where P is investing for 
purposes of generating wealth (i.e. B > I) and hopes to capture some 
of the value generated through such wealth creation. Whether or not 
a third party is being harmed by P’s investment is irrelevant to P for 
purposes of deciding on whether to invest I to generate wealth. In 
fact, P would invest, even if D did not exist. Conversely, row-II type 
cases arise when P’s investment is motivated by a desire to transfer 
wealth (exceeding that which is created by his investment) from a 
person who is placed in a dire situation as a result of that invest-
ment. In fact, P would not invest, if he believed that he could not 
ﬁnd a party, such as D, from whom she could extract wealth beyond 
the value generated by his investment. Hence, the latter situation 
corresponds to rent-seeking, and these are precisely the conditions 
under which we claim a defense of duress should exist.
Finally, we would like to highlight the simplicity of the model 
used to derive our results. The model abstracts from many issues, 
including; potential investment by D, in addition to investments by 
P; the potential for price caps as in Shavell’s article,35 the possibility 
of court error in the determination of the conditions under which 
the defense of duress ought to be made available; and the possibility 
32 Shavell, 36 J Leg Stud 325 (cited in note 2).
33 Ben-Shahar and Bar-Gill, 33 J Leg Stud 391 (cited at note 2).
34 Shavell, 36 J Leg Stud 325 (cited in note 2).
35 Id.
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of parties having misperceptions about each other’s characteristics. 
Needless to say these are extremely important considerations.36
I I I .  C O N C L U S I O N
The conditions under which it is socially desirable to allow a de-
fendant to assert a defense of duress is closely related to whether 
the plaintiff has engaged in rent-seeking activity. In particular, 
the duress defense should be made available when the plaintiff’s 
investments are motivated by the prospect of rent-seeking rather 
than wealth generation. Otherwise, the plaintiff can be incentiv-
ized to make investments whose primary objective is to redistrib-
ute wealth without generating much of value. We have used a very 
simple game-theoretical framework to derive this conclusion with 
the hope of highlighting the importance of rent-seeking for purposes 
of deﬁning wrongful threats in the context of the contract law doc-
trine of duress.
36 We may be too quick to suggest that this and similar statements need no mention-
ing. Although most law and economics scholars, perhaps because of commonalities 
in their education, feel no need to state that economic analyses proceed in steps 
by isolating various issues with hopes that future research will slowly build up on 
benchmark models, this implicit understanding may not be shared by some scholars. 
Many criticisms of Seidenfeld and Mungan, 99 Minn L Rev 1423 (cited in note 1), 
developed in Bayern, 99 Minn L Rev Headnotes 141 (cited in note 5), for instance, 
seem consistent with this type of miscommunication.
All use subject to University of Chicago Press Terms and Conditions (http://www.journals.uchicago.edu/t-and-c).
